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ABSTRACT 
 
China has embarked on a wide range of economic reforms in the past thirty years. 
One of the major reforms was to restructure state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into 
public listed companies (PLCs) to improve the performance and quality of 
corporate governance of SOEs. However, the unique phenomenon of China’s 
equity market is that the state continues to hold a controlling stake in PLCs with 
less than 40% of shares tradable in the stock market. This seriously affects the 
performance and quality of corporate governance of China’s PLCs.  
 
This mini-thesis investigates the effects of split-share structure reform on SOEs in 
China, with particular focus on an analysis of the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance of listed companies. By using a sample of the top 
50 companies based on the ranking of the 2004 Fortune top 100 PLCs, a negative 
correlation was found between the state ownership structure and firm performance 
of China PLCs before the announcement of split-share structure reform. However, 
by using the same samples and techniques, the analysis shows that the 
improvement in the diversified ownership structure had a positive impact on firm 
performance in China PLCs after the reform.  
 
 
KEYWORDS 
Corporate governance, Split-share structure, Principal-agency problem, Firm 
performance, Ownership structure, State-owned enterprises, Minority 
shareholders’ interest, Non-tradable shares, China Public Listed Companies, 
Return on Equity 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Statement  
 
China has moved gradually from a centralized planned economy to a market-
orientated economy since it embarked on an open-door policy in 1978. There were 
many economic reforms adopted during the transition period. The formation of 
two exchange stock markets in Shanghai (1990) and in Shenzhen (1991) was one 
of the major economic reforms. The aims of establishing these two stock markets 
were firstly to capture a large part of capital by issuing corporate shares to the 
public and secondly to improve the overall performance of SOEs through 
shareholding reform (Chi and Young, 2007:361). 
 
In contrast to other markets, the shareholding structure of Chinese public listed 
companies (PLCs) is unique. Two classes of shares can be issued by PLCs. 
Tradable shares are the one listed on the stock market and can be freely bought 
and sold by normal investors. Non-tradable shares, on the other hand, are 
dominated by state and legal institutions, which are not allowed to trade freely on 
the stock market. According to Inoue (2007:4), government controls 
approximately 60% of total shares issued in 2004 with state shares (32%) and 
legal person shares (30%) respectively. The large portion of non-tradable shares 
implies government has direct control in corporations, which might lead to some 
associated phenomenon, for example, insider control, ineffectiveness of 
management and principal-agency problems, etc. (Li and Zhang, 2007:7-9). 
 
With the continuous corporatization of SOEs and the rapid expansion of the 
security markets (Zhou, 2008), corporate governance has attracted attention 
because good corporate governance assists shareholders to ensure managers run 
the company on behalf of shareholders and make decisions in terms of profit 
maximization. However, the large amount of non-tradable shares indicates that 
there is low market liquidity for minority investors. Such a shareholder structure 
illustrates that state ownership in PLCs conflicts with other shareholders’ interest, 
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which could cause principal-agency problems. The convergence of interest theory 
developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976:311-312) indicate that firm performance 
decreases as the degree of divergence of interest increases. When ownership and 
control are separated, the interest of principals and agents diverge, therefore, 
principals want to increase the firm value while agents plan to maximize their own 
benefits. Thus, the agents may not operate in the best interest of the principals 
which may be detrimental to the company. 
 
The current financial studies on ownership-performance relations in China 
concentrated on two main questions: (1) Does ownership has an impact on 
corporate performance; and (2) Does direct or indirect government control has an 
impact on firm performance (Qi, Wu, and Zhang, 2000; Gunasekarage et al., 
2007; Chen and Zhu, 2005; Qiang, 2003; Sun and Tong, 2003; Xu and Wang, 
1999; Zhu and Ma, 2009). Most of their studies show that concentrated state 
ownership has impacted on firm performance negatively and suggested that to 
diversify the ownership structure is the key step to improve corporate performance 
of PLCs.  
 
In April, 2005, China’s Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) made an 
announcement of the split-share structure reform, which is to convert large 
portions of non-tradable shares held by the government and legal persons to 
tradable A-shares. The purpose of the split-share structure reform is to promote 
efficiency and limit the power of the substantial shareholders and management of 
listed companies, to promote return on financial investment, to strengthen the 
ability of direct-financing and to allocate resource efficiently, etc (CSRCa, 2005).  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to find out how the state ownership 
structure affects the performance of PLCs in China; it would also investigates the 
effects of split-share structure reform in China, with particular focus on an 
analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance of 
Chinese PLCs. 
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1.2 Research Question 
 
As it has been discussed in the problem statement, the quality of corporate 
performance in China is challenged with principal-agency problems as the state 
and its representatives have less resource to monitor and discipline the behavior of 
management. In addition, the principal-agency problem arising when the state acts 
as a major shareholder, profit maximization may not be its primary goal as it is 
expected from other shareholders.  
 
However, due to the unique features of the Chinese governance structure, the 
centralized ownership structure together with a weak legal regulatory framework 
and weak debt and equity markets, the real practice of corporate governance 
performance faces many problems (Zhou, 2008). This study therefore, attempts to 
address the following main questions: (1) what is the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance? (2) Is split-share structure reform 
improving corporate performance of Chinese PLCs successfully? 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
The empirical study will be a quantitative analysis based on a sample of the top 50 
companies listed on the ranking of the 2004 Fortune top 100 PLCs. A regression 
model will be set up to estimate the correlation between ownership structure and 
firm performance. In addition, the study is also going to test the effectiveness of 
split-share structure reform by comparing the firm performance (measured by 
return on equity) for the same sample between 2004 and 2008. 
 
1.4 The Significance and Limitations of Study 
 
The significance of this study is to contribute to the ongoing debate by presenting 
and analyzing ownership-performance relations of PLCs in China. However, this 
empirical study also has some limitations. First of all, the study estimates a short-
term effect of split-share structure reform as the reform only started from middle 
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of 2005. Meanwhile, it would be a more powerful analysis if all PLCs listed on 
the stock markets were able to be included in the final sample.  
 
1.5 The Structure of the Paper 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the second chapter is the theoretical 
framework, in which the theoretical arguments on ownership structure and firm 
performance will be reviewed through various perspectives. Recent empirical 
studies on ownership-performance relationships are also discussed in the chapter. 
The third chapter gives a descriptive overview on ownership structure and firms’ 
performances in China. It briefly explains the major problems of corporate 
governance in China and critically discusses the influences of concentrated state 
ownership structure on corporate performance of Chinese public listed firms. It 
therefore introduced split-share structure reform as the solution to the problem 
within the last section of the chapter. The fourth chapter is the research 
methodology, which discusses the sample selection and data collection process; 
explains variable measurement and shows how a regression model would 
demonstrate the hypothesis. The discussion of research result will be followed in 
the next chapter. The final chapter will be the general conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Firms, as described by Shah et al. (2011:515), are “a network of relationships 
representing contractual arrangements for financing, capital structure, 
managerial ownership and compensation.” Therefore, the determination of firm 
performance could be influenced by many factors, such as growth, concentration, 
capital intensity, an organization’s structures, etc (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 
1989:399-401). For the past couple of years, economists and policy makers have 
become interested in finding the link between ownership structure and firm 
performance. Whether and how ownership structure ultimately affects firm 
performance in the framework of corporate governance, has attracted much 
attention in financial circles and literature.  
 
Compared with other economic concepts, the concept of ―corporate governance‖ 
is relatively new, even in more developed market economies (Zhou, 2008). 
According to Cadbury (1999), as quoted in the King Report (2002:6) “Corporate 
governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social 
goals and between individual and communal goals…the aim is to align as nearly 
as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society.” Figure 2.1 
clearly presents a corporate governance system among all parties. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation & Developments (OECD) was the first 
one who published the principles of corporate governance (Zhou, 2008). It has 
been widely used for all OECD member countries to assist corporations to 
evaluate and improve their performance (Maier, 2005:5).  
 
Four main principles of good corporate governance are identified by the OECD: 
(1) Designing and ensuring an effective corporate governance framework; (2) 
Requiring well defined shareholder rights and equitable treatment of shareholders; 
(3) Keeping a high level of independence and responsibilities of the board; and (4) 
Maintaining a high level of disclosure and transparency (OECD, 2004:17-24).   
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Figure 2.1: Corporate governance system 
Source: IFC, 2008.  
 
The implication of principles of good corporate governance is to help corporations 
use their capital efficiently and also allow the shareholders to feel confident about 
their investment decisions (OECD 2004:7). However, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997:738) pointed out that corporate governance is nonexistent in some 
developing countries. Corporate governance also has become a popular discussion 
topic among all study fields since the middle of 1990s and it attracted lots of 
attention in the Asian financial crisis debate. (Claessens and Fan, 2002:71).  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide theoretical background to support this 
research. The next section reviews recent research on ownership structure and 
firm performance through ownership concentration, managerial ownership and 
asymmetric information respectively. The following section presents some 
empirical findings regards to the governance-performance relations. The last 
section draws the conclusion. 
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2.2 A Descriptive Overview on Ownership-performance Relationship  
 
At present, many modern corporations are owned by one group of people (i.e. 
shareholders or owners), but are operated by another group of people, such as 
managers and a board of directors. One important issue here is how to guarantee 
the management runs the business in the interest of owners but not their own. 
Cheng and Tzeng (2011:61) thought that ownership structure is an important 
instrument for corporate governance by influencing management behavior and 
thus resulting in different firm performance. This section reviews financial 
literature on the ownership-performance relationship through three main 
perspectives: ownership concentration, managerial ownership (inside ownership) 
and asymmetric information. 
 
2.2.1 Ownership concentration and firm performance 
The earliest work on the study of ownership-performance relationship was 
done by Berle and Means (1932). They argued that when there is a relatively 
dispersed shareholding ownership structure in big corporations; each small 
shareholder can not afford to spend much time and money on monitoring 
management’s activities. Therefore, those who are participated in the daily 
affairs (i.e., the managers and directors), can use the resources of companies 
to their own advantage of the shareholders’ (Berle and Means, 1932:255). 
They concluded that separating ownership from control is the main cause of 
managers-shareholders conflict, where managers are controlling modern 
corporations and shareholders are relatively powerless.  
 
The concerns of Berle and Means (1932) led to the agency theory developed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976:308-310). This theory states that managers 
and directors have a responsibility to run the business in the interest of 
shareholders (maximize profits) rather than on their own (e.g. maximize 
salary or growth of market share). Principal-agent problems arise when 
managers (agent) undertake their own goals but not the one of investors 
(principal). Jensen and Meckling (1976:312-316) also argued due to the 
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separation of ownership and the control of a corporation, owners of these 
corporations lose their supervision and control over the managers, which 
may enable powerful managers to pursue their own interests. Thus, 
separation of control may affect corporate performance negatively under 
diffusion of ownership structure.  
 
Since the mid-1980s, the agency conflict between major shareholders and 
minority shareholders in corporations had been in the financial spotlight. On 
the one hand, people who have the traditional perspective on corporate 
governance, such as Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argued that concentrated ownership improves firm performance 
through providing better incentives and abilities to monitor managers. 
Larger shareholders tend to address the agency problem since they are 
interested in maximizing profit and also maintaining the firm’ assets 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997:754). On the other hand, the modern approach to 
corporate governance shows concentrated ownership may also have a 
detrimental effect on corporate performance when controlling blockholders 
extract rent from minority shareholders (Jong, A. et al. 2002:4; Maher and 
Andersson, 1999:31). The principal-agent problem occurs easily when there 
is an unequal treatment and divergence of interest among shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997:740-742). Therefore, the main focus of the 
principal-agent problem that stems from the interest conflicts between 
strong managers and weak outsider shareholders now changes to the interest 
conflicts between larger controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Claessens and Fan, 2002:75). 
 
Barclay and Holderness (1989:372) explained how blockholders enjoy their 
corporate benefits by using their voting power through the ―private benefits 
of control‖ theory. They argued that if corporate benefits are related to the 
proportion of shareholders’ fractional ownership, blockholders shall trade at 
the exchange price if there is no private benefit from block ownership. 
However, if it does, blockholders will try to secure their benefits by trading 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
at a premium price instead of the exchange price on the stock market. The 
price difference between block price and exchange price is a private benefit 
received from block controlling. The ―private benefits of control‖ theory 
also highlights another important issue: large shareholders can influence 
corporate decisions by using their voting right in order to maximize their 
own value. This is harmful to minority shareholders. Good corporate 
governance should ensure good financial returns for all investors (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997:740).  
 
2.2.2 Managerial ownership and firm performance 
Berle and Means (1932) stated that if ownership is separated from control, it 
can cause shareholder-manager conflict. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued 
that as the interest of principals and agents differ, agents pursue their own 
benefits and not act on behalf of principals. Therefore, one solution to this 
problem is to align the interest between principals and agents by establishing 
an incentive reward system or to make them shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976:309). By doing so, they found that a high level of 
managerial ownership helps to match the interest between shareholders and 
managers. This will ultimately lead to better performances. Consequently, 
managerial ownership is correlated with the corporate performance 
positively, based on their convergence-of-interest hypothesis.  
 
However, Fama and Jensen (1983:305-307) pointed out larger concentrated 
managerial ownership has offset costs, which leads to the entrenchment 
effect. They argued that if a manager holds a small portion of shares, it 
actually helps to solve the agency problem by aligning the interest between 
manager and shareholder; however, if a manager holds a large portion of 
shares, then he/she will influence the decision-making by using his/her 
voting right.  
 
A new argument about ownership-performance relations has recently come 
to light, claiming ownership structure may have no influence on firm 
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performance if considering it as an endogenous factor. Demsetz (1983:375-
390) argued that ownership structure, whether concentrated or diffused, 
reflects decisions made by all shareholders. All types of ownership structure 
are equal, which should represent the profit maximizing interests of 
shareholders. Some other factors, such as firm size, industry, investor 
protection etc could also have an impact on firm performance. Therefore, no 
relationship is linked between ownership structure and firm performance as 
firm performance is restricted by internal/external environmental factors and 
not only by ownership structure.  
 
2.2.3 The influence of asymmetric information on firm performance 
It is notable that agency problems arise easily under asymmetric information 
circumstance. The classic principal-agent problem is the shareholder-
manager conflict, where managers focus on their own goals instead of the 
interest of the shareholders. That is to say, the agency problem arises when 
principals and agents are not pursuing the same goal or principals may not 
know whether agents have a good behavior due to incomplete and 
asymmetric information between them (Eisenhardt, 19879:58). 
 
Separation of control and ownership is also link directly to asymmetric 
information. This is because agents will act by considering their own self-
benefit whenever possible if there is no appropriate monitoring and 
controlling from principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:308-309). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976:308), the total agency costs can be 
divided into three components: monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual 
loss. However, it is impossible to monitor an agent perfectly, especially with 
such high agency costs. Therefore, when these procedures fail to monitor an 
agent, moral hazard problem will happen. No matter how carefully 
monitored, agents always have chances to behave unobserved. When the 
agent’s interests are differing to the principal’s interest, a moral dilemma 
occurs. In other words, moral hazard exists if the agent takes unobservable, 
hidden or undesirable actions. 
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Adverse selection problem is another potential risk when it comes to 
information asymmetry. Eisenhardt (1989:61) stated that adverse selection 
exists due to unobservable or hidden information of agents. That is to say 
principals may be unable to verify the skills or abilities of agents, either at 
the time of hiring or while the agent is working. Therefore, principals may 
not select the best agent to work for them due to the lack of proper 
information. 
 
In the case of the agency problem of majority/minority shareholders’ 
conflict of interests, Voß and Xia, (2005:15) found that majority 
shareholders can easily apply asymmetric information to acquire an 
advantage by undermining the interest of minority shareholders. Therefore, 
providing adequate information to all investors, so as to ensure them to be 
well noticed of the financial status of companies, is an approach that will 
reduce the existence of asymmetric information and avoid the negative 
consequences of the principal-agent problem (Chung, et al., 2005:37-38). 
 
2.3 Empirical Evidence on Ownership-performance Relationship 
 
The theoretical arguments for ownership-performance relationship suggest that 
the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance could be 
positive, negative or neutral. The international empirical evidence on studies of 
ownership-performance relations also show mixed results (Hu and Izumida, 
2008:72). 
 
First of all, some show there is a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou’s (2007:144-158) 
studied the impact of ownership structure on firm performance by observing 175 
listed Greek firms in 2000. Three performance measurements are used in the 
analysis: Tobin’s Q, labor productivity and profitability. The fraction of 
management shares and important investors shares were considered as ownership 
measurement. The result shows both measures of ownership are positively 
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correlated to Tobin’s Q, which suggests that a firm’s performance is improved 
through better monitored and disciplined management behavior when shares are 
concentrated. 
 
Hu and Izumida (2008:77) found the centralized ownership structure, such as 
individual, family holding or financial institution block holding etc., is dominant 
in most of continental Europe and East Asian economies. They also found block 
ownership often has a positive relationship with corporate performance. Claessens 
et al (2002:77) conducted a survey on corporate governance in. The survey proved 
that concentrated ownership is positively correlated with firm performance. 
However, once the state acts as the controlling owner (take China
1
, for instance), a 
negative effect is shown on corporate performance.  
 
Other studies found the opposite however. Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001:3-4) 
observed a U-shaped pattern relationship between profitability and ownership 
concentration based on data analysis from 1995 to 1997 in Russia. They found 
profitability reaches the minimum point when ownership concentration 
approaches 56%. It indicates that high ownership concentration affects market 
value of companies negatively as there is a conflict between major and minority 
shareholders regards to profit distribution.  
 
Shah et al (2011:518-522) examined the link between managerial ownership and 
corporate performance by using the KSE 100 index firms in 2005 in Pakistan. The 
main focus of the paper was to find out how managerial shareholders who are 
directly involved in decision making influence firm performance. The 
performance is measured by Marris ratio, Tobin’s Q, return on equity and return 
on investment respectively, the proportion of shares controlled by the board of 
directors has been chosen as ownership variable. The result indicates the 
ownership concentration has a negative influence on corporate performance.  
                                                             
1 The empirical evidence on ownership structure and firm performance in China is described 
in detail in chapter 3. 
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Finally, some other empirical studies investigate the relationship of endogeneity 
of ownership structure and firm performance. Here, no link was found between 
ownership structure and a firm’s performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985:1155) 
argued that ownership structure is an outcome of shareholders’ decisions; that a 
concentrated ownership structure is the best way to maximize a firm’s 
performance. In their study, ownership concentration is determined by firm size, 
control potential, regulation and amenity potential, and then estimate linear 
regressions of accounting profit rate on concentration — the fractions of shares 
owned by the five, the twenty largest shareholders, and a Herfindahl measure for 
511 U.S. firms. The result demonstrates that there is no significant relation 
between concentrated ownership structure and profitability, so ownership 
structure is an endogenous result of the balance of the costs and benefits of 
ownership.  
 
In summary, the international empirical evidence shows ownership concentration 
could be positive, negative and even may not correlate with firm performance. 
The reason why there are different results among previous studies, as summarized 
by Hu and Izumida (2008:72) could be the limitation of ownership-performance 
measurement, the differences in estimating technique used, and date selection bias 
etc. Moreover, the different corporate governance environments of these firms 
could be another reason why the results are so different. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997:769-773) indicated that countries adopt different corporate governance 
systems according to the regulatory and legal environment of their own. 
Therefore, there is no exact answer for ownership-performance relation studies, 
the results vary across countries and over time.  
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
Corporate governance is the set of regulations, laws and institutions, which is used 
as to administer the corporations. It is designed to foster the best competitive 
performance required to achieve the corporation's primary objective by 
influencing firm’s attitude, accountability and responsibility towards all 
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stakeholders, such as employees, shareholders, and customers etc. The importance 
of good corporate governance has been proven essential to ensure good behavior 
of corporations and to protect the shareholders’ welfare (Zhou, 2008). 
 
Corporate governance has become a hotly debated topic worldwide at the 
moment. Both theoretical and empirical studies on the ownership-performance 
relations reach the following conclusions: First of all, ownership concentration is 
positively related with firm performance because a concentrated ownership 
structure has a better monitor and control effect on managers. Some continental 
Europe and East Asian empirical studies show that a block holding ownership 
structure would improve corporate performance as the result of better monitoring 
of the business. However, if the ownership involves the state, the firm’s 
performance is negatively related to the concentrated ownership structure.  
 
Secondly, the convergence-of-interest hypothesis suggests introducing managerial 
share-ownership may reduce the principal-agent problem by aligning the interest 
between principal and agent. However, entrenchment effect hypothesis refuted the 
argument, saying that managerial share-ownership may have an adverse effect on 
firm performance, because it may increase in managerial opportunism and then 
decrease the firm’s value. However, some other researchers think the managerial 
ownership structure is not related to firm performance because ownership 
structure is an endogenous variable.  
 
Finally, empirical studies show various different results made by ownership-
performance studies are due to the differences of the corporate governance 
system, sample selection and equation estimation etc. Therefore, it suggested that 
ownership-performance relations vary across countries and over time.  
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CHAPTER 3:  A DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW ON 
OWNERSHIP STURCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN 
CHINA  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
China's transition from a state-planned economy towards a market-oriented 
economy started almost three decades ago (Zhou, 2008). However, the term 
―corporate governance‖ is still a relatively new concept in China. ―Corporate 
governance‖ in China is defined as ―a system to regulate and monitor 
relationships among all parties with interests in a business organization.” (Clarke, 
2003:494). China has made substantial progress on corporate governance, since it 
began its market reform in 1978 (Lin, 2001:2). Not only its corporations, but also 
government bodies and regulators in China have improved greatly. Government 
regulators and professional institutions have issued a set of laws, codes, 
regulations, and standards with a view to lay a good foundation for corporate 
governance in the future (Zhou, 2008). With the reform of the economic system 
and the development of the capital market in China, accelerating the process of 
corporate governance has become the main way to improve the performance of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the economic transition (Wang, 2004:1).  
 
Although China has achieved substantial progress in corporate governance over 
recent times, China’s practice of corporate governance is not going smoothly. It is 
seriously affected by many existing problems due to the unique features of the 
Chinese governance structure. According to Lin (2004:7) and Zhou (2008), there 
are some major problems during the practicing corporate governance in China: (1) 
Ambiguities of principal-agent relationship; (2) Highly concentrated ownership 
structure; (3) Weak protection of outsiders; (4) Inadequate transparency and 
disclosures of financial data; (5) Weak independent board of directors and 
supervisory board.  
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This chapter presents a descriptive overview of ownership structure and firm 
performance in China. It first starts to describe the features of ownership structure 
of PLCs. Then it is followed by a discussion of the influences of state behavior on 
firm performance with a particular focus on the principal-agent problems and 
interest conflict in PLCs in China. The next section describes the solution of the 
problems that occurred in practicing corporate governance in China - Chinese 
split-share structure reform in detail and the last section is a short conclusion.  
 
3.2 The Features of Ownership Structure of Chinese Public Listed 
Companies 
 
From its founding in 1949 until the late 1970s, The People Republic of China was 
operated under a strictly planned economic system, which means everything was 
highly centralized by the government (Zhou, 2008). During this period, state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) was the main form of ownership structure of Chinese 
corporations, characterized by low productivity and work inefficiency, with high 
input of factors of production but low output (Lau, et al., 2007:427). 
 
Until the late 1980s stock markets and stock companies were established as a 
means to restructure the industrial sector and improve its performance (Xu and 
Wang, 1997:7). Consequently, the ownership structure of PLCs shows some 
unique features, compared with that in other stock markets around the world. 
Figure 3.1 shows the structure of Chinese PLCs. Shares in Chinese PLCs can be 
grouped into tradable and non-tradable shares. The tradable shares can be traded 
in Chinese exchanges, while the non-tradable shares are not allowed to trade in 
the stock markets. 
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Figure 3.1: The share structure of China PLCs 
 
The non-tradable shares are dominated by the state shares and the legal person 
shares. The state-owned shares refer to that held by different levels of 
governments or by state-owned enterprises. The second type refers to the shares 
owned by the domestic institutions, such as stock companies, non-bank financial 
institutions or SOEs (Zhou, 2008). Table 3.2 lists the percentage of different types 
of shares; it obviously shows that non-tradable shares account about 60% of 
shares issued by Chinese PLCs during year period 1994 to 2004. 
 
Table 3.1 Share structure of PLCs in China (1994-2004) 
Classes 1994 1996 1998 2000 2004 
State shares 43% 35% 34% 39% 32% 
Legal person shares 22% 27% 28% 24% 30% 
Tradable A-shares 33% 35% 34% 36% 28% 
Other types of shares 2% 3% 4% 1% 10% 
 Source: Qiang, 2003:774 (data: 1994-2000); Inoue, 2007:4 (data: 2004) 
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The tradable shares are separated into A-shares, B-shares, H-shares and N-shares. 
The tradable A-shares refer to that offered to and freely traded by the general 
public. It is issued with nominal values in Ren Min Bi (RMB
2
), and it can be 
subscribed and traded only in RMB (Zhou, 2008). It is restricted to be purchased, 
owned and traded only by Chinese nationals and residents (Inoue, 2005:4). 
 
B-shares, H-shares and N-shares belong to foreign shares. B-shares are designed 
for foreign investors, but traded in the domestic capital market in China. It is 
issued with nominal values in RMB, but can be subscribed and traded in foreign 
currencies (Zhou, 2008). H-shares are issued by the companies listed on the Hong 
Kong stock market and traded in Hong Kong dollars. N-shares are shares that 
listed, subscribed, and traded on the New York stock market in US dollars (Li, 
2005-73). 
 
3.3 The Influence of State Behavior on Firm Performance 
 
A typical feature of Chinese PLCs is its mixed ownership structure with 
dominated state and legal person shareholders, therefore, the issue of ownership 
and firm performance becomes more complicated (Claessens and Fan, 2002:78). 
Lin (2001:7) thinks the major problems of practicing corporate governance in 
China originate from unclearly defined property rights and the ambiguity of 
principal-agent relationship. Property rights are difficult to define under the state 
ownership system because the property rights belong to everyone and no one in 
particular (Zhou, 2008). In China SOEs are owned by the whole people, 
consequently, the state represents the whole people to act as the first order agent 
on behalf of the people to appoint and delegate operational power of SOE. This is 
thought to be the fundamental reason why corporate governance is a problem in 
China (Qiang, 2003:776).  
 
                                                             
2
 RMB is a name of Chinese currency. 
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The reluctance of Chinese authorities to fundamentally clarify property rights may 
originate from their political considerations (Zhou, 2008). Li et al. (2008:18) 
pointed out that the poor corporate governance performance of listed companies is 
the result of majority state ownership of shares. Their research also shows that 
minority shareholders’ overly weak supervision of the listed companies in China 
would result in the continuous falling of share prices in the market over several 
years.  
 
Sleifer and Vishny (1997:767-768) state that privatizing state firms by introducing 
outside non-state investors and replacing political control with private control 
would establish a more efficient ownership structure and make a significant 
improvement in the performance of state firms.  
 
Due to a highly concentrated ownership structure in China, the state acts as a 
majority shareholder in many listed corporations, this creates several problems 
(Zhou, 2008). Cheung et al. (2008:464) points out that different level of 
governments may have different incentives for the ownership of the firm. It is 
possible for different levels of governments to have comprehensive goals: social 
welfare or other policy ones, for example, regulate and enforce laws to achieve 
social macro-economic goals rather than profit maximization of the state-owned 
corporations. Therefore, state shareholder status may trigger conflict of interest, 
for the government may be concerned about whether the state is sufficiently 
protected as a holding shareholder of the enterprise (Zhou, 2008) and also worry 
about losing state assets and government control on the market (Claessens and 
Fan, 2002:78). It may give rise to monitoring difficulties because most of these 
goals are not easy to reach and need to balance one against the other. Clarke 
(2003:501) points out the monitor agent may not even know how to measure and 
trade off among those different state objectives, so it is difficult for an agent to act 
effectively to achieve those multiple objectives.  
 
Moreover, it is not surprising that the state controls most board seats when the 
state is the controlling owner (Li et al, 2008:9; Ho, 2003:24). There are few board 
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vacancies available for minority and outside shareholders (Zhou, 2008). If the 
insider-managers have been controlled by state, agents thus do not perform 
properly in the interest of the minority shareholders because the influence of the 
larger shareholders is much stronger.  Lin (2004:8-9) then indicated that it will be 
more difficult and problematic to establish a high quality level of corporate 
governance if links the conflicts of interest between large and small shareholders 
together with inadequate separation between ownership and management. 
 
In addition, state shareholders and their operators care more about maximizing the 
assets that could bring to them rights, resources and power than concerning the 
companies’ managerial achievements and the price of their stock in the security 
market. This behavior, together with a weak legal system made the stock index 
low and shrunk the whole market value (Liu, 2006:417-418).  
 
Ho (2003:5) concludes the main principal-agent problem in China involves multi-
parties: controlling state shareholders, directors/supervisors, managers and outside 
minority shareholders; it forms a triple principal-agent relationship among them as 
shown in Diagram 3.2. The first agency problem is between minority shareholders 
and the board of directors. That is because the cost is very high for minority 
shareholders to monitor the board of directors’ behavior. In contrast, the cost is 
relatively low for majority shareholders to monitor and assess the board of 
directors. Therefore, minority shareholders may play as free riders, that is, to 
entrust majority shareholders to examine the board of directors for them. 
However, the board of directors would be trapped in a difficult situation when the 
dual principals have conflicting objectives. So, the second agency problem is 
between major shareholders and the board of directors. The third one is the 
conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders as 
the majority shareholders control the information source.  
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Figure 3.2: Principal-agent problems and interests conflict in PLCs in 
China  
 
Source: Ho, 2003:5 
 
3.4 Empirical Evidence on Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
 
There are many studies that focus on the relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance over the past few decades. Their empirical studies showed 
conflicts of interest between the government as a major shareholder and small 
shareholders affect the firms’ performance. Xu and Wang (1999:85-90) were 
probably the first to work on this topic. They investigated whether ownership 
structure significantly affects the performance of PLCs by using pooled firm-level 
data from 1993 to 1995. A firm’s performance is measured by market-to-book 
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ratio (MBR), return on equity (ROE) and return on asset (ROA). The analysis 
shows that corporate performance is significantly positively related to ownership 
concentration. However, when it turns to study the effects on firm performance by 
examining a mixed ownership structure (state ownership, legal person ownership 
and private ownership), the results present that the legal person ownership 
structure is positively impacted on firm performance but there is a negative 
correlation between state ownership, private ownership and firm profitability. It 
suggested that large legal persons (institutional investor) are motivated to monitor 
and control the behaviour of managers, thus, leads to better performance.  
 
Qi et al. (2000:599-603) were investigating to find out how the performance of 
PLCs is influenced by ownership structure with a focus on studying whether 
corporate performance can be determined by the percentages of share controlled 
by the government and legal persons. Based on the data of 774 firms listed on 
Shanghai stock market between 1991 and 1996, measuring firm performance by 
ROE, their findings support Xu and Wang’s study (1999) and illustrated that the 
percentage of legal person shares is positively correlated with performance but the 
percentage of state shares is negatively related to corporate performance. In 
addition, they also found that corporate performance would rise with the ratio of 
relative legal person shares to state shares. Sun and Tong (2003:210) evaluated the 
performance changes of 634 SOEs listed on exchange markets since share issuing 
privatisation (SIP) from 1994 to 1998. By using three measures of performance, 
MBR, net income to sales and operating income to sales, they found that SIP 
successfully improved SOEs’ earning ability, real sales and labour productivity, 
however, SIP failed to increase capital returns and leverage effectively. Moreover, 
their study also found a negative correlation between state ownership and firm 
performance, but positive impact on firm performance with legal person shares. 
This finding is in accordance with that of Qi et al. (2000) and Xu and Wang 
(1999). 
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Gunasekarage et al. (2007:385-389) did an empirical study on ―The influence of 
the degree of state ownership and the ownership concentration on the performance 
of listed Chinese firms‖. The study investigated the relationship between the level 
of different ownership structure and firm performance from different perspectives. 
They used Tobin’s Q value or MBR to measure the firm performance based on the 
sample size of 1034 listed companies during 2000 to 2004. The combination of 
three levels of state ownership and legal person ownership were tested: (1) 
ownership is less than 5%, (2) ownership is in between of 5% and 36% and (3) 
ownership is more than 36%. The result shows that firm performance is negatively 
affected by the level of state ownership, especially for those companies held more 
than 36% state ownership. 
 
To sum up, by using different samples and methodology, the empirical studies 
disclose the negative overall impact of state shareholding on firm performance, 
but researchers found a positive impact for legal person shareholding on firm 
performance in China. The findings show that it can improve firm performance 
through entitling legal person shareholders to control and monitor the behavior of 
managers and board of directors more effectively because they are less politically 
oriented and focus more on business objectives.  
 
3.5 Chinese Split-Share Structure Reform 
 
The split share structure of the Chinese capital market is inherently demanded at 
the result of the existence of a large amount of non-tradable shares with 
centralized ownership structure. In fact, Chinese government recognized the non-
tradable share problem on the equity market and tried to solve the problem in 
1999 and 2001. The first attempt was in 1999, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) selected two corporations to sell their state shares to private 
investors, but it failed because of low market confidence (Beltratti and Bortolotti, 
2006:3). The second attempt was in June 2001, the state council of China 
announced a major reform by reselling state shares gradually to public, but it 
failed within four months due to dramatic market turbulences (Qiang, 2003:781).  
 
 
 
 
24 
 
In April, 2005, CSRC made an announcement on a new pilot programme
3
 to 
invite four corporations to transform non-tradable shares to tradable shares by 
compensating current shareholders via alternative methods, such as bonus shares, 
cash and other ways. The market reaction was good and it was marked as the new 
milestone on the way of quality improvement of PLCs (Inoue, 2005:2; Jingu, 
2006:36).  
 
As discussed by Jingu, (2006:47-48) and Lu, et al., (2008:5), the split share 
structure reform achieves great economic significance on the performance of 
Chinese PLCs. The policy promotes non-tradable state-owned shares and legal 
personal shares to be tradable gradually on stock market. As the non-tradable 
shares become tradable, shareholders will be able to sell their shareholdings on the 
market freely and this should quickly adjust their indifference to the market price. 
Once share prices begin to reflect the true firm values, conditions should become 
more conducive to merge and acquisition activity (Jingu, 2006:48). Consequently, 
Liu (2005:419) concluded the reform greatly improved the liquidity in the 
domestic stock market in China, which provided firms with greater scope and 
more decentralised ownership structure.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The intrinsic and fundamental problem of corporate governance in China is the 
highly concentrated state ownership structure. The major problems of practicing 
corporate governance in China come from unclearly defined property rights and 
ambiguities of the principal and agent relationship (Zhou, 2008). Under such a 
centralized state ownership structure, the principal and agent problem becomes 
more complicated because the state is a representative of everyone in the country 
and delegates as the principal on behalf of public. Therefore, the state monitors 
the managers and board of directors to achieve its economic, social and political 
                                                             
3
  For more information on the programme, read the article ―Circular on issues relating to the 
pilot reform of listed companies' split share structure‖ (CSRC: 2005a). 
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objectives. Although the Chinese government attempted to solve this problem 
through promoting the development of the non-state-owned sector as a mean of 
improving corporate governance (Zhou, 2008), the state control still remains 
substantial in listed companies, which affects corporate performance negatively. 
 
The unique chrematistics of ownership structure of Chinese PLCs is the existence 
of large amount of non-tradable shares, which combined with state shares and 
legal person shares. Therefore, the large percentage of non-tradable shares and the 
trading of different types of shares in the market distort the market pricing 
mechanism and lower the efficiency of resource allocation.  
 
Most empirical researches on ownership structure and firm performance in China 
show that the centralized state ownership structure has a negative impact on 
corporate performance. Studies indicate that one of key steps to improve corporate 
performance is to reduce the state control in PLCs by decreasing state 
shareholdings. The split-share structure reform in 2005 is a new policy to 
diversify the ownership structure by reducing the non-tradable shares in the 
market. Therefore, it is interesting to see the effects of this reform on firm 
performance of the listed companies, which will be presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This study seeks to find out the effectiveness of split-share structure reform by 
comparing the changes of firm performance (from 2004 to 2008) through cross 
section data analysis. The technique of analysis is to use the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) model to analyze the correlation between ownership structure and 
firm perfomrance. In addition, the model will be interpreted by Eviews software.  
 
4.2 Sample Selection and Description 
 
The sample of this study is based on the ranking of 2004 Fortune top 100 PLCs
4
 
and the ranking list is measured by the total revenue of all Chinese companies 
listed both domestically and internationally. (Cheung et al., 2008:467). Many 
researchers choose the top 100 Chinese listed companies as their study sample. 
According to Lu, et al., (2007), the top 100 PLCs contribute 80% of the total 
value of the domestic A-share market in China and therefore it is meaningful to 
study their performance due to their significant position in the economy. Dong and 
Xue, (2009); Andrews and Tomasic (2006) also indicate that most of top 100 
PLCs consist of SOEs and are characterised by concentrated state ownership 
structures. By studying these companies, it could indicate the problems of the 
current corporate governance system, such as the independence of board of 
directors and minority shareholder protection, etc.  
 
Due to time constraints and data availability, only the top 50 companies listed in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets were considered in this study (i.e. the final 
sample excluding the companies which listed outside of China because the data is 
                                                             
4
 The list is available in Chinese online at http://www.techcn.com.cn/index.php?doc-view-
132464.html (accessed 18/11/2011). 
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not available. See the list of sample firms in appendix 1). However, as this paper 
intends to investigate the effectiveness of split-share structure reform on firm 
performance by comparing the data between 2004 and 2008, the sample was 
reduced to 45 companies as 5 companies were de-listed between 2004 and 2008. 
In addition, two more companies were taken out due to incomplete information. 
Consequently, the final sample size is only 43 companies.  
 
The figure 4.1 below shows the distribution of sample firms across various 
industries. The largest sector is iron and steel industry, which contributed 12 
companies (27.9%) to the total sample. The manufactures of electrical equipment 
is the second largest sector, which consists of 8 companies (18.6%) in total. The 
other dominant sectors are finance and wholesale and retail trade industry with 4 
companies each (9.3%). This industry classification of sample firms illustrated 
that most of the largest companies are representatives of SOEs in China as the 
state traditionally monopolised resources to maintain its social welfare goals 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997:767). 
 
Figure 4.1: Industry classifications of sample firms 
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4.3 Data Source and Collection  
 
Data on required variables in this study were collected at the end of the financial 
year. The data comes from the RESSET Financial Research Database
5
, which is 
created by Shanghai Gildata Service Co. Ltd. This database is a powerful source 
as it provides a wide range of information across the areas of economics, finance 
and accounting. It consists of corporate governance information of all PLCs, for 
example, basic company information, shareholder structures, fraction of different 
types of shares and ownership concentration index, etc. It is also very useful data 
in terms of collecting accounting data and financial ratios, such as book values of 
total assets, debt and equity. The data is regarded as complete, consistent and 
accurate as it has direct contact with all listed companies and updates the 
information monthly. Some researchers, for instance, Gunasekarage et al., (2007) 
used the database to collect shareholder information for their study on ownership-
performance relations of PLCs in China.  
 
4.4 Hypothesis Development 
 
As it has been discussed in the previous chapter, the ownership structure of PLCs 
in China has two main features: Firstly, the share structure is complex and mainly 
concentrated in the hands of the government. Secondly, state shares and legal 
person shares are not tradable on the stock market. Therefore, the split-share 
structure reform was announced in 2005 which aims to improve corporate 
performance by transferring non-tradable state and legal person shares to tradable 
shares. It implies that the diversified ownership structure has a positive effect on 
improving the performance of public listed companies in China, because split-
share structure reform could arrange the interest between tradable shareholders 
and non-tradable shareholders; thus improve the market liquidity and efficiency. 
Based on information above, the research hypothesis can be developed as follows:  
                                                             
5
 RESSET Finance Research Database is available online at http://www.resset.cn (accessed 
12/10/2010); see http://www.resset.cn/en/product/db.jsp for more detailed information.  
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Null Hypothesis: The extent of state ownership structure has no impact on firm 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The extent of state ownership structure has a negative impact on a 
firm’s performance, because the state has multiple objectives other than profit 
maximization. Conflict of interest between the state and other shareholders might 
affect performance negatively.  
 
4.5 Variable Consideration 
 
4.5.1 Performance variable 
        As the hypothesis postulates a firm’s performance as the dependent variable, 
the question arises what data can be used to measure performance. Some of 
the more popular indicators of performance used in empirical studies (Chen 
and Zhu, 2005:56; Qi et al., 2000:599; Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001:14; 
Hu and Izumida, 2008:76) are Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio (MBR), return 
on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). However, this study will only 
use ROE as a performance variable because the data for other variables is 
either not available or incomplete.  
 
4.5.2  Ownership structure variables 
The empirical studies suggest that there are different ways to choose 
ownership structure variables based on different assumptions and hypothesis 
that need to be tested. For example, most of the studies using Herfindahl 
index to measure ownership concentration (Dinga et al., 2009; Xu and Wang, 
1999). Gunasekarage et al (2007), classify the percentage of state ownership 
into three groups to test the degree of state ownership on firm performance.  
 
Chinese PLCs have a mixed ownership structure; therefore this study 
includes the following variables: (1) ownership by state, (2) ownership by 
private investors. However, this study intends to see the effect of state 
ownership as a blockholder on a firm’s performance, therefore, a dummy 
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state ownership (i.e. only looking at the effect of controlling state shares 
equal and over 50 percentage of shares of the total shares issued) is the one 
will be used in the model. Meanwhile, the estimation of the impact of the 
legal person ownership structure on a firm’s performance is excluded due to 
its high correlation to state shares. Ownership by private investors is included 
in the model in order to see the influence of tradable shares on a firm’s 
performance.  
 
4.5.3  Control variables 
Three control variables are used to avoid misspecification problem in the 
empirical analysis. The size of a firm is considered as an important control 
variable by many studies (Lau et al., 2007; Gunasekarage et al., 2007; Qi et 
al., 2000; Zhu and Ma, 2009). Cheung et al (2008:471) pointed out that firm 
size has an influence on market valuation and corporate governance 
performances. This is because larger firms have more resources to deal with 
corporate governance compared to small firms. Larger firms also care more 
about financial discourse as they are under public scrutiny. Chhibber and 
Majumdar (1998:568) also indicated that larger firms have the ability to 
operate business more effectively by using their market power. However, they 
also argued that larger firms are inefficient, due to size or diversification. 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007:15) described firm size as the effect of the 
―value-maximizing size of the firm‖. That is to say, the larger the firm, ceteris 
paribus, the more capital resource it will get from shareholders. This then 
implies a more decentralized ownership structure exist in larger firms. All 
studies mentioned above used natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets to represent firm size and the reason for logarithm is to avoid skewness 
of the variable. 
 
Another popular control variable included in the analysis is financial leverage, 
which proxy as the debt-to-equity ratio (DER). Gunasekarage et al., 
(2007:385) emphasized that debt contracts can prevent managers to choose 
some risky projects; therefore, it’s considered as a good tool to solve agency 
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problems. Sun and Tong (2003:200) thought leverage has a correlation with a 
firm’s performance as most of Chinese PLCs are SOEs, and SOEs has lower 
borrowing costs.  
 
The last control variable that will be used in the model is profitability, which 
is represented by net profit growth rate (NPGR).  
  
4.6 Model Specification 
 
This study is interested in examining the relationship between state ownership 
structure and firm performance, with particular focus on comparing the results 
between 2004 and 2008. All the variables have been explained in the previous 
section, however, in order to clearly show the correlation between state ownership 
structure and firm performance, a dummy variable has been created. This is to set 
all those companies with state holds more than 50 percentages of total shares 
issued as one, otherwise is zero. It should also be noted the analysis of state 
ownership and legal person ownership on firm performance must be run 
separately as there is much correlation between them (Xu and Wang, 1998, Sun 
and Tong, 2003; Qi et al., 2000). 
 
By fitting the variables into the model, the regression model is presented as 
follows: 
 
ROE = 0 + 1 DUMFST + 2FTS + 3 SIZE + 4 DER + e                     (1) 
Where 
0:            Intercept; 
Βs:       Coefficient;  
ROE:   Return on equity, measured as net profit/average total shareholders’ 
equity; 
DUMST: Dummy variable, ―1‖ states if the state does have a controlling share (=> 
50%) and the state does not have controlling share (< 50%) stands for 
―0‖  
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FT:   Fraction of tradable shares, measured as the percentage of total shares 
issued, is the sum of FTA, FTB and FTH;  
SIZE:  Measured as logarithm of book value of total assets;  
DER:  Debt-to-equity ratio, measured as total liabilities/total shareholders’ equity. 
NPGR: Net profit growth rate, measured as net profit/net profit (-1)  
e    :      Error term 
 
By running the model for 2004 and 2008 individually, it can tell whether the split-
share structure reform has any effects on improving firm performance by 
comparing the firm performance result for 2004 and 2008.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a general framework of research methodology used in the 
analysis. Following the example of other authors, the sample for testing the 
hypothesis consisted of the top 100 largest listed companies as the shareholding 
and performance data for these firms were most readily available. The data of 
sample firms was collected from Gildata Data Company as it provides complete 
information of all variables needed in the analysis. A regression model will be set 
up to analyze the data and variables used in regression model are explained in 
detail. The result of research will be presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents empirical results by using OLS model explained in the 
previous chapter. As it has been discussed in chapter 2, a firm’s performance 
would be affected by centralized state ownership structure because of the conflict 
of interest between the state as a major shareholder and minority shareholders. In 
order to test the effectiveness of split-share structure reform policy and find out 
whether the diversified ownership structure of PLCs in China has a positive effect 
on improving a firm’s performance, the empirical analysis is divided into two 
steps. The first step starts with an analysis of the impact of state ownership on 
firm performance in 2004, which provides information on how ownership-
performance was like before the reform. It then followed by the second step: an 
analysis of the impact of state ownership on firm performance in 2008 (holding all 
variables the same) in the next section. By comparing the results obtained from 
these two cross section data analysis, it can tell whether spilt-share structure has 
an effect on improving corporate performance or not. The last section of this 
chapter draws a short conclusion. 
 
5.2 The Impact of State Ownership on Firm Performance of PLCs in 2004 
 
As the hypothesis is going to test whether the extent of concentrated state 
ownership has any impact on firm performance, a dummy variable is created here 
to show the influence of state acts as bolckholder (i.e when state have a 
controlling share equal or more than 50% of total share issued) on firm 
performance. The fraction of Legal personal share is excluded from the model to 
avoid multi-collinearity. The null hypothesis states that if the state ownership is 
irrelevant to firm performance, it should show no correlation between DUMST 
and ROE.  
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The table 5.1 reports the results from the regression model, which examines the 
relationship between the state ownership and firm performance, based on 43 
observations in 2004. The regression results illustrate a negative correlation 
between firm performance measured by ROE and block state ownership structure 
measured by DUMST in 2004, which rejected null hypothesis immediately. The 
negative coefficient on DUMST indicates that the firm performance is lower for 
those firms who have greater than 50% state ownership. The result is supported by 
other empirical studies, such as Xu and Wang, 1999; Song and Tong, 2003; Qi et 
al., 2000, etc. Due to the small sample size of this study, the DUMST variable is 
statistically insignificant (t = -1.11), however, it still recognizes that the large 
proportion of state shares hurts corporate performance and needs to be reduced. 
 
It is noticeable that the coefficient for fraction of tradable shares (FT) is 
significantly (t = -2.26) negatively related to firm performance at conventional 
level. It implies that both domestic investors and foreigner investors have little 
influences on improving firm performance under concentrated state ownership 
structure.  
 
The control variable NPGR is positive correlated (t=7.36) to ROE at a significant 
level (P<5%), it indicates that the higher the growth rate is, the better the 
performance will be. Meanwhile, the negative coefficient of DER indicated that 
higher interest rate decreasing the firm profit and negative coefficient of SIZE 
implies the larger firm is less efficient due to a lack of proper control from senior 
management, especially under the centralized state ownership structure. However, 
the t-statistics for these two variables are very low, which do not have much 
explanatory power.  
 
In general, the model has an adjusted R
2 
score of 57.2%, which indicates that all 
the independent variables in the model explained 57.2% of the dependent variable. 
High F-statistics at 12% also implies the significance of the model. 
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Table 5.1 State ownership and firm performance analysis of 2004 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/08/11   Time: 15:49 
Sample: 1 43 
Included observations: 43 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.289593 0.300648 0.963232 0.3417 
DUMST -0.029281 0.026266 -1.114769 0.2721 
FT -0.002192 0.000968 -2.264122 0.0295 
SIZE -0.006049 0.029274 -0.206621 0.8374 
DER -0.000927 0.001975 -0.469421 0.6415 
NPGR 0.025029 0.003400 7.361833 0.0000 
R-squared 0.622968 Mean dependent var 0.125302 
Adjusted R-squared 0.572018 S.D. dependent var 0.105038 
S.E. of regression 0.068717 Akaike info criterion -2.388866 
Sum squared resid 0.174713 Schwarz criterion -2.143117 
Log likelihood 57.36062 F-statistic 12.22698 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.074272 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
5.3 The Impact of State Ownership on Firm Performance of PLCs in 2008 
The purpose of the split-share structure reform is to improve the firm performance 
by converting non-tradable share to tradable share. In order to investigate whether 
the split-share structure reform has improved the situation of corporate 
performance of PLCs in China, it requires a comparison on ownership structure 
and firm performance between 2004 and 2008. By using the same variables and 
observations, the model presents an analysis of the changes of ownership structure 
on firms’ performance after the reform. The table 5.2 reports the results from the 
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model, which examines the effect of state ownership structure on firm 
performance in 2008 measured by the ROE.  
 
It is obvious that the changes of non-tradable state shares have improved firms’ 
performance in 2008 compared with that in 2004. This can be seen from the 
correlation between the fraction of tradable shares and ROE. Compared to the 
negative correlation between fraction of tradable share and firm performance in 
2004, the FT is now positively correlated (t=2.23) to the ROE – it shows a 95% 
confidence level (P<0.05). This implies that both domestic investors and foreigner 
investors are confident to spilt-share structure reform.  
 
However, the fraction of state shares is still negatively (t = -1.57) related to firm 
performance. This is because government learned from past experience and 
intends to release the shares gradually to the market. It then suggests that a further 
reducing of state shareholding is required for better improvement on firm 
performance. It then rejected the null hypothesis as state ownership structure does 
matter to firm performance, and it accepted the alternative hypothesis that the 
extent of concentrated state ownership structure has a negative impact on 
corporate performance. 
 
It also noticeable that NPGR is negatively (t = -028) related to ROE, compared to 
significant positive relation to ROE in 2004, this indicates that corporate 
performance in 2008 was seriously affected by financial crisis. The coefficient for 
DER is still negative here but not at conventional level. On the other hand, the 
control variable SIZE is negatively impacted on ROE in 2004, but it became 
positively (t = 1.92) correlated with performance at a significant level of 10%. It 
implies larger firms would perform better for that it requires more investment 
from one shareholder especially under diffused ownership structure (Kapopoulos 
and Lazaretou, 2007:15). 
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The overall model has an adjusted R
2 
score of 23.8%, which indicates that all the 
independent variables in the model explained 23.8% of the dependent variable. 
Most of the t-statistics of independent variables are relatively small; it is partly 
due to a short-term effect of the reform. In addition, firm performance was 
seriously affected by financial crisis in 2008; it may also contribute to small t-
statistics.  
 
Table 5.2 State ownership and firm performance analysis of 2008 
Dependent Variable: ROE 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/09/11   Time: 03:47 
Sample: 1 43 
Included observations: 43 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.712890 0.626711 -2.733142 0.0096 
DUMST -0.094766 0.060233 -1.573315 0.1242 
FT 0.006837 0.003068 2.228284 0.0320 
DER -0.004939 0.005606 -0.881084 0.3840 
SIZE 0.107642 0.055919 1.924971 0.0619 
NPGR -0.000761 0.002704 -0.281452 0.7799 
R-squared 0.328751 Mean dependent var 0.047707 
Adjusted R-squared 0.238042 S.D. dependent var 0.185032 
S.E. of regression 0.161515 Akaike info criterion -0.679653 
Sum squared resid 0.965220 Schwarz criterion -0.433904 
Log likelihood 20.61254 F-statistic 3.624227 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.064703 Prob(F-statistic) 0.009087 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents an overall discussion on state ownership structure and firm 
performance. The empirical results are reported from two cross section data 
analysis based on 43 sample firms in 2004 and 2008 respectively.  Both reports 
indicate that a centralized state ownership structure is negatively correlated with 
corporate performance, which rejected null hypothesis as it states there is no 
impact between ownership structure and firm performance. Another main finding 
is that the split-share structure reform increased the proportions of shares for 
private investors, which improved the firm performance through a diffused 
ownership structure.  
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
Corporate governance is recognized as critical to economic development in many 
emerging markets (Zhou, 2008), but it is still a new and challenging field to the 
Chinese. This paper reviews ownership-performance relations through various 
perspectives with an analysis of relationship between state ownership and 
corporate performance of Chinese PLCs.  Through a full analysis of the influence 
of state behavior on firm performance, it concludes that a substantial diversified 
ownership structure; especially on the state ownership structure of PLCs is 
required. The split-share structure reform therefore is the start of solving the root 
problem of corporate governance in China.  
 
This empirical study investigated the correlation between ownership structure and 
firm performance before split-share structure reform and afterwards. The firm 
performance is measured by ROE and dummy variable of state ownership and 
private ownership are ownership variable.  
 
The research results indicated that state-owned share structure has a negative 
impact on the corporate performance and the private investors have very limited 
power to monitor the firm performance before the reform.  
 
In contrast to the result in 2004, more privately held shares had a positive impact 
on company performance. This indicates that the improvement in the diversified 
ownership structure had a positive impact on firm performance in China PLCs 
after the reform through limiting the power of the substantial shareholders and 
management of listed companies  
 
This empirical result is supported by the findings of Qi et al. (2003:600-602), Xu 
and Wang (1999:86-88) and Gunasekarage et al. (2007:386-388). Their studies all 
indicated that centralized state ownership structure affected the firm performance 
negatively measured by different techniques and various samples.  
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To sum up, by comparing the correlation result of ownership structure and firm 
performance between 2004 and 2008, the split-share structure reform has 
positively promoted the diversification of ownership structure and improved the 
firm performance in general. However, due to the time limitation and data 
availability, the empirical analysis only tested the effectiveness of reform in the 
short-term. A further research on the same topic but based on a longer period is 
needed.  
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Appendix 1: The List of Sample Firms 
 
No. Company Name Code 
1 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (600028) 
2 China Unicorn Limited (600050) 
3 Minmetals Development Co., Ltd. (600058) 
4 Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., LTD. (600019) 
5 Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited (600688) 
6 TCL Corporation (000100) 
7 Huaneng Power International, Inc. (600011) 
8 * Sinopec Yangzi Petrochemical Co., Ltd. (000866) 
9 * Jilin Chemical Industrial Co., Ltd. (000618) 
10 China Southern Airlines Company Limited (600029) 
11 Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Co., Ltd. (000825) 
12 Zhongxing Telecom Co., Ltd. (000063) 
13 Maanshan Iron & Steel Company Limited (600808) 
14 Beijing Shougang Co., Ltd. (000959) 
15 Angang New Steel Co., Ltd. (000898) 
16 Chongqing Changan Automobile Co., Ltd. (000625) 
17 Tangshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (000709) 
18 Sichuan Changhong Electric Co., Ltd. (600839) 
19 
#
 China Eastern Airlines Corporation Limited (600115) 
20 Beiqi Futian Automobile Co., Ltd. (600166) 
21 China International Marine Containers (Group) Limited. (000039) 
22 GD Midea Holding Co., Ltd. (000527) 
23 China Merchants Bank Co., Limited (600036) 
24 Konka Group Co., Ltd. (000016) 
25 Hunan Valin Steel Tube and Wire Co., Ltd (000932) 
26 Handan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (600001) 
27 China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd. (600016) 
28 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co., Ltd. (600000) 
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29 QingdaoHaier Co., Ltd. (600690) 
30 Shanghai Friendship Group Incorporated Co. (600827) 
31 Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd. (000761) 
32 BOE Technology Group Co., Ltd. (000725) 
33 * Jinzhou Petrochemical Co., Ltd. (000763) 
34 Sinochem International Co., Ltd. (600500) 
35 Shanghai Construction Co., Ltd. (600170) 
36 Laiwu Steel Co., Ltd. (600102) 
37 Ningbo Bird Co., Ltd. (600130) 
38 Inner Mongolian Baotou Steel Union Co., Ltd (600010) 
39 Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Company Limited (600871) 
40 * Torch Investment Co., Ltd. (000549) 
41 Gree Electrical Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai (000651) 
42 
#
 Shanghai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (600849) 
43 FAW Car Co., Ltd. (000800) 
44 * Sinopec Qilu Co., Ltd. (600002) 
45 Anyang Iron & Steel Inc. (600569) 
46 Panzhihua New Steel & Vanadium Co., Ltd. (000629) 
47 XiamenC&Dlnc. (600153) 
48 Yanzhou Coal Mining Company Limited (600188) 
49 Huaxia Bank Co., Ltd. (600015) 
50 Shenzhen Kaifa Technology Co., Ltd. (000021) 
 
Notice: The numbers with star (*) on are the de-listed companies that have been 
either purchased or merged by other companies during the period 2004 to 2008. 
The numbers with 
# 
on are the deleted companies due to incomplete data.  
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